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INTRODUCTION 
John Adams worried that the true story of the American Revolution would 
be lost on later generations.  In a letter to his dear friend, Dr. Benjamin Rush, 
he lamented, “The History of our Revolution will be one continued Lye from 
one End to the other.”1  “The Essence of the whole,” Adams wrote, “will 
be that Dr Franklins [sic] electrical Rod, Smote the Earth and out Spring General Wash-
ington.  That Franklin electrified him with his Rod—and thence forward these two conducted 
all the Policy Negotiations Legislation and War.”2  Clearly, Adams would have not 
have been confused for an optimist.3  Fortunately for the prospects of future 
generations, however, his worst fears have not been realized—no school has 
been reported to teach children this mythical version of the Founding.  Nev-
ertheless, there is some truth in what Adams wrote to Dr. Rush: the legends 
of our nation’s founding are often better known than the history.4   
Take, for example, the Constitutional Convention.  In its most simple 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I would like to give special thanks 
to Professor William Ewald, whose seminar inspired this Comment and who provided invaluable 
guidance and feedback throughout this process, and Roy E. Brownell II, for taking the time to read 
my drafts and provide detailed comments that made this Comment better in many ways.  I am also 
grateful for the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law Editors and Board for their hard 
work in getting this Comment to publication. 
 1  Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (Apr. 4, 1790), FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-0903. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 571 (1998) 
(“Within a few years after Independence, however, whatever optimism Adams had had for the 
refinement of the American character was gone.”). 
 4 See, e.g., David McCullough, Knowing History and Knowing Who We Are, 34 IMPRIMIS 4, at 3 (Apr. 
2005), https://imprimis.hillsdale.edu/knowing-history-and-knowing-who-we-are/ (“In the ro-
tunda of the Capitol in Washington hangs John Trumbull’s great painting, ‘The Declaration of 
Independence, Fourth of July, 1776.’  It’s been seen by more people than any other American 
painting.  It’s our best known scene from our past.  And almost nothing about it is accurate.”). 
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form, the story is distilled down to the genius of the “Father of the Constitu-
tion”—James Madison.5  Alternatively, it is framed as a clash between two 
groups: one, the Federalists, favoring a strong central government and the 
other, the Anti-federalists, believing that such an outcome would betray the 
democratic principles on which American independence was achieved.6  
There is some truth to this narrative.  To be sure, Madison was one of the 
most important figures in shaping the Constitution and, broadly speaking, 
the delegates to the Convention and those who engaged in the debate over 
ratification organized into the two aforementioned factions.7  Lost in this 
classical telling, however, is a recognition of the influential role played by 
many of the lesser-known delegates and of the divisions within those factions 
in which they organized.8   
The purpose of this Comment, then, is twofold: first, to highlight the con-
tributions of two unsung delegates to the Constitutional Convention, James 
Wilson and Gouverneur Morris; and second, in the process of pursuing the first 
goal, to examine some of the internal divisions within the Federalist party and 
highlight, in some small way, the complexities of the politics of the Convention. 
Although both men shared the honor of serving in the Pennsylvania dele-
gation to the Constitutional Convention, Wilson and Morris came from dif-
ferent backgrounds and evolved into politicians of very different styles.  Wil-
son, the son of a lower-middle class farmer, immigrated from Scotland in 1765 
 
 5 EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 270 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“As James Madison, ‘the 
Father of the Constitution,’ explained . . . .”). 
 6 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 549 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
disagreements between the two groups over individual liberties); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 568 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing disagreements between 
the two groups over principles of federalism); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 342 
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing disagreements between the two groups over the inclu-
sion of a bill of rights). 
 7 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 322 (1992) 
(“On one side, Madison, Wilson, Ellsworth, Hamilton, Jay, Iredell, the Morrises, Sherman; on the 
other, the junta of immensely articulate Pennsylvania antifederalists and their counterparts north 
and south—Melancton Smith, Luther Martin, James Winthrop, George Mason, Patrick Henry, 
Elbridge Gerry—the list of truly interesting actors in this drama seems endless.”); see also Richard 
A. Epstein, The Federalist Papers: From Practical Politics to High Principle, 16 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
13 (1993) (discussing Federalist thought as articulated in the Federalist Papers); Paul Finkelman, Turn-
ing Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, if Anything, from the Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849, 
856–70 (2001) (reviewing SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS (1999)) (providing an overview 
of Anti-federalist thought). 
 8 See BAILYN, supra note 7, at 327 (“And the mass of federalist writings reveals the great range and 
variety of thinking on that side of the struggle, by no means all represented in the Federalist papers.”); 
John P. Kaminski, Antifederalism and the Perils of Homogenized History: A Review Essay, 42 R.I. HIST. 30, 
31 (1983) (reviewing THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)) (“Storing 
tends to simplify and homogenize what is really a mosaic of Antifederalist positions varying 
throughout the country.”). 
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while in his early twenties;9 he diligently studied law and philosophy and be-
came one of the most sophisticated legal theorists of the founding generation, 
later serving as an Associate Justice on the first Supreme Court and writing a 
series of detailed lectures on law.10  Morris, born into a wealthy New York 
family, displayed a natural brilliance and enrolled in King’s College at the age 
of twelve; a lawyer by trade, he moved to Philadelphia to pursue what he saw 
as the more exciting world of politics and business.  His many suitors—he was 
a bachelor until fifty-seven—and his wooden left leg—from a carriage acci-
dent when he was twenty-eight—gave him a mercurial quality that contrasted 
with the calculating, often rigid, Wilson.11  Fellow delegate William Pierce, in 
his character sketches of all the delegates to the Convention, described Wilson 
as “no great Orator,” but one whose arguments were “clear, copious, and 
comprehensive.”12  He would win over his opponents “not by the charm of 
his eloquence, but by the force of his reasoning.”13  Morris, on the other hand, 
was “one of those Genius’s in whom every species of talents combine to render 
him conspicuous and flourishing in public debate.”14  “No Man has more 
wit,” Pierce wrote, “But with all these powers he is fickle and inconstant,—
never pursuing one train of thinking,—nor ever regular.”15 
More consequential than their differing personalities, however, were their 
differing constitutional theories.  These differences, however, are not readily 
apparent from how they cast their votes.  Both Wilson and Morris were 
avowed Federalists who argued forcefully for a strengthened central govern-
ment.16  Although their votes were aligned on many of the key issues at the 
Convention, a comparison of their rationale for these votes reveals a funda-
mental disagreement on the nature of republican government.  Wilson be-
lieved that republican government could only endure if the people were rep-
resented in all aspects of government; this philosophy took seriously the 
revolutionary concept of popular sovereignty: the theory that ultimate politi-
cal authority resided in the people and could be delegated to the government 
only on a limited basis.  Morris, however, engaged in what was described by 
John Adams as the “analysis of antiquity”17: the belief that society’s inherent 
 
 9  William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 902–03 
(2008) (“James Wilson was born in 1742 . . . . His ship landed in New York in the fall of 1765.”). 
 10  Id. at 913. 
 11 See generally RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 44–52 (2009) (detailing the backgrounds of other Convention co-conspirators). 
 12  3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 92 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. 
Press rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS]. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See BAILYN, supra note 7. 
 17 WOOD, supra note 3, at 592. 
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distinctions between the few and the many must be balanced in a mixed con-
stitution.  In Morris’s view, republican government depended not on the in-
volvement of the people in every aspect of government, but on the proper 
balancing of the people and the aristocracy in separate spheres of government. 
Despite the prominent role they played at the Convention, both men are 
woefully understudied.  “The neglect of Wilson, the unsungest of the unsung 
heroes,” writes historian William Lee Miller, is so often “deplored in the re-
tellings of the events of the American beginnings . . . that in the select world 
of books his unsungness is sung.”18  Similarly, Morris, despite speaking more 
than any other delegate at the Convention, has yet to be the subject of a 
scholarly article that focuses exclusively on his contributions there.19   
For this Comment, I examine Wilson’s and Morris’s speeches at the Con-
stitutional Convention.  While both men served on influential committees 
during the Convention,20 I focus solely on their contributions during  
 
 18 WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE BUSINESS OF MAY NEXT: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING 62 
(1992).  For an overview of the scholarship on James Wilson, see Ewald, supra note 9, at 923–24, 
n.54. 
 19 There are several biographies that have been written on Morris, but his treatment in academic 
journals is sparse.  The best recent treatment of Morris’s life is RICHARD BROOKHISER, 
GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS—THE RAKE WHO WROTE THE 
CONSTITUTION (2003).  Other major biographies include WILLIAM HOWARD ADAMS, 
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE (2003); JAMES J. KIRSCHKE, GOUVERNEUR 
MORRIS: AUTHOR, STATESMAN, AND MAN OF THE WORLD (2005); MARY-JO KLINE, 
GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE NEW NATION: 1775–1788 (1978); MELANIE RANDOLPH 
MILLER, AN INCAUTIOUS MAN: THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS (2008); MELANIE 
RANDOLPH MILLER, ENVOY TO THE TERROR: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION (2005); MAX M. MINTZ, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1970); THEODORE ROOSEVELT, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS (1888); JARED SPARKS, 
THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, 3 vols. (1832); HOWARD SWIGGETT, THE 
EXTRAORDINARY MR. MORRIS (1952).  There is no scholarly article that focuses exclusively on 
Morris’s contributions to the Constitutional Convention.  His treatment in academic journals, how-
ever, includes Paul Finkelman, The Pennsylvania Delegation and the Peculiar Institution: The Two Faces of 
the Keystone State, 112 PA. MAG. HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 49 (1988); Catharine Keppele Meredith, 
Sketch of the Life of Gouverneur Morris, 2 PA. MAG. HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 185 (1878); Donald L. Rob-
inson, Gouverneur Morris and the Design of the American Presidency, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 319 
(1987); Philip Wild, Gouverneur Morris, Conservative, 5 PA. HIST. J. MID-ATLANTIC STUD. 141, at 204–
06 (1938); Philipp Ziesche, Exporting American Revolutions: Gouverneur Morris, Thomas Jefferson, and the 
National Struggle for Universal Rights in Revolutionary France, 26 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 419 (2006). 
 20 For a discussion of Wilson’s contributions during the Committee of Detail, see William Ewald, The 
Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 282 (2012) (“Wilson was deeply involved in the 
drafting process, and the Committee report undoubtedly bears many traces of his influence.  It is 
incorrect, however, to exaggerate this point and to characterize the Committee as ‘a committee of 
Wilson and four others.’”).  For a discussion of Morris’s contributions to the Committee of Style 
and Arrangement, see Letter from James Madison to Jared Sparks (Apr. 8, 1831), in 3 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 499 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“The finish given to the 
style and arrangement of the Constitution fairly belongs to the pen of Mr. Morris; the task having, 
probably, been handed over to him by the Chairman of the Committee, himself a highly respecta-
ble member, with the ready concurrence of the others. A better choice could not have been made, 
as the performance of the task proved.”).  For an overview of all of the committees convened at the 
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proceedings of the “Committee of the Whole House.”21  Through these 
speeches, both men articulated, in a more comprehensive manner than most 
delegates, their theory of republican government.  Furthermore, a compari-
son of these theories highlights the revolutionary shift in political thought that 
occurred during the American Revolution.22 
For such a momentous event in the history of the United States and the 
history of the world,23 there is very little primary source material on the ac-
tual proceedings of the Philadelphia Convention.24  To allow delegates to 
speak freely and without fear of political consequences, the Convention was 
conducted entirely in secret.25  An official journal was kept, but in somewhat 
careless fashion and with few details other than vote tallies and the text of 
proposed motions.26  Therefore, the balance of what we know about what 
was actually said at the Convention comes from the various unofficial notes 
taken by the delegates.27  Of the eight delegates that took notes outside of the 
 
Convention, see John R. Vile, The Critical Role of Committees at the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787, 
48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 147, 171-74 (2006) (describing the committees’ roles). 
 21 When a body is said to operate in a “Committee of the Whole House,” this means that all repre-
sentatives of that body are included in the proceedings.  See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 
2d 176, 202 n.19 (D.D.C. 2003) (describing how the U.S. House of Representatives has certain 
procedures allowing it to operate as a Committee of the Whole House). 
 22 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1991) (“[The 
American Revolution] was one of the greatest revolutions the world has known, a momentous up-
heaval that not only fundamentally altered the character of American society but decisively affected 
the course of subsequent history.”). 
 23 See id. 
 24  See BEEMAN, supra note 11, at 445 (“Much of what we know about the deliberations inside the 
Assembly Room of the Pennsylvania State House during the summer of 1787 comes from just one 
source—James Madison’s notes on the debates of the Convention.”); Ewald, supra note 9, at 931 
(“[T]he documentary record is far from ideal: the Madison Notes are the best evidence we have, 
but it should be borne in mind that they can represent only a brief summary of what he in fact 
said.”). 
 25 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.15 (1974) (“The meetings of the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787 were conducted in complete privacy.  Moreover, all records of those meetings 
were sealed for more than 30 years after the Convention.  Most of the Framers acknowledged that 
without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have been written.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 26 See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 as a 
Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1707, 1723–24 (2012) 
(“The Convention appointed Major William Jackson to serve as the secretary.  In this capacity, he 
kept an official Journal of the proceedings.  The Journal includes minutes of the full Convention 
and the proceedings as a Committee of the Whole.  The minutes record the text of most of the 
resolutions before the Convention and the votes taken on them.  Unfortunately, William Jackson 
made some mistakes in his record keeping.  In addition, Jackson also omitted various important 
details, such as the dates of certain votes.  Jackson also intentionally destroyed some of the records, 
either because he did not think them worth saving or because he was seeking to preserve secrecy.”).  
But see Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal Convention?, 80 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1620, 1682 (2012) (“So, how bad were the original records?  Not perfect, but not so bad 
after all.”). 
 27 See Maggs, supra note 26, at 1724–25 (explaining that Madison’s notes are the most comprehensive, 
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context of their own speeches, James Madison’s are far and away the most 
comprehensive and detailed.28  Madison’s notes contain the imperfections 
one would expect given the enormous task of recording several months of 
dense speeches on constitutional theory while simultaneously planning his 
own remarks and strategy.29  Furthermore, Madison revised his notes late in 
his life, mostly to align details such as vote tallies with the official journal.30  
Despite these drawbacks, Madison’s notes are the most important source for 
studying the Convention.31  I rely heavily on them for this Comment, but I 
have tried to buttress my claims with the notes of other delegates, or point 
out where the delegates’ notes are in disagreement, when necessary. 
Historians have offered a number of frameworks through which to view 
the Convention of 1787.32  In broad strokes, the Convention lasted from May 
25 to September 17, 1787, with the major issues, such as representation of the 
states in the national legislature, being settled in the first half of the summer, 
before July 26, and many of the less contentious provisions being discussed in 
August and September.  For the purposes of this Comment, with its narrow 
focus on James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris, I have chosen to organize the 
events in a manner that is tailored to their contributions to the Convention 
and thus focuses heavily on the proceedings prior to July 26.  In Part I, I dis-
cuss Morris’s first speeches in the brief period between May 25 and 30.  In 
Part II, I discuss the period between May 31 and July 1, during which time 
Wilson articulated much of his constitutional theory while Morris took leave 
from the Convention for personal business.  Morris’s return on July 2 marks 
the beginning of Part III, which lasts until July 26.  During this time, Morris 
spoke on nearly every issue considered by the Convention and, in the process, 
articulated much of his constitutional theory.  In this Part, with both Wilson 
 
but listing others that took notes). 
 28 See id. 
 29 See Ewald, supra note 9, at 929–32 (discussing Madison’s note taking process and how Madison did 
not document informal conversations or proceedings that may have impacted the Constitutional 
Convention).  In addition, Madison’s notes are vulnerable to a couple major, but unavoidable, 
limitations.  First, the notes cover only the Committee of the Whole House, and it is important to 
recognize that his notes from these proceedings are not word-for-word transcripts, but rather his 
best attempt to paraphrase a given speech.  Second, much of the Convention’s business was con-
ducted in smaller committees, during private dinners, or in the annexes of the Convention hall 
during breaks.  There is scant evidence from the committees, and even less regarding the many 
informal gatherings of delegates. 
 30 See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (2015) (arguing that Madison revised his notes to a greater extent than is commonly 
recognized). 
 31 See id. at 1 (“James Madison’s record of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in the sum-
mer of 1787 is the single most important source for the Convention.”). 
 32 Compare Ewald, supra note 9, at 938 (partitioning discussion of the Convention into three “Acts”), 
with CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION (1966) (partitioning discussion of the 
Convention into three phases which encompass different dates than Ewald’s three “Acts”). 
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and Morris having contributed substantially to the Convention, I compare 
and contrast their theories of governance.  For the purposes of this Comment, 
my analysis concludes when the Convention adjourned for ten days on July 
26.  By this point, the Convention had addressed most of the major constitu-
tional issues and would spend much of August and September sorting out the 
Constitution’s finer points.33  I discuss this period only briefly in Part IV.  
While Wilson and Morris continued to be intimately involved with the pro-
ceedings during this time, for this Comment I am concerned with their 
broader theories of government that were articulated earlier in the summer. 
I.  OPENING ARGUMENTS: MAY 25–30 
Gouverneur Morris’s first stint at the Convention was short-lived but 
consequential; he was present when the Convention achieved a quorum on 
May 25 but left only six days later to tend to personal matters.34  This absence 
would keep him from the Convention until July 2, but those first six days 
provided enough time for him to make his mark.35  Following Edmund Ran-
dolph’s introduction of the Virginia Plan on May 29, it became clear that 
many of the delegates did not see themselves limited by the Convention’s call 
to recommend alterations to the Articles of Confederation.  Morris agreed 
that an entirely new form of government was required and moved on May 
30 for the Convention to pass a three-part resolution: 
1. Resolved, That a union of the states, merely federal, will not accomplish the 
objects proposed by the articles of the confederation, namely, common 
defence, security of liberty, and general welfare. 
2. Resolved, That no treaty or treaties among any of the states as sovereign, 
will accomplish or secure their common defence, liberty or welfare. 
3. Resolved, That a national government ought to be established, consisting 
of a supreme judicial, legislative and executive.36   
 
 33 See Ewald, supra note 9, at 937 (“The final phase (‘Details, Details, Details’) extends from August 6–
September 11, when the Convention debated the fine print of the Committee draft; there was a 
final coda (September 12–17, ‘Last Rites and Retrospect’) during which the text was polished and 
signed.”) (citing ROSSITER, supra note 25, at 247-48). 
 34 BROOKHISER, supra note 19, at 81 (2003). 
 35 Id.   
 36 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 12, at 39.  It is useful to briefly note the distinction between 
a federal government and a national government, as it was understood at the Convention.  This is 
particularly important because that understanding is in stark contrast to our current understanding 
of the terms.  Gouverneur Morris explained the distinction between federal and national this way: 
“the former being a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a com-
pleat [sic] and compulsive operation.”  Id. at 34.  Thus, a “federal” plan would more closely resemble 
the Articles of Confederation, whereas a “national” plan would feature a strong central govern-
ment.  See generally id. at 33–35 (discussing certain limitations of the Articles of Confederation and 
the extent the new government should address these limitations).  Richard Beeman also provides a 
useful summation of the first two of these three propositions:  
 “The meaning of that language, though convoluted, was nevertheless clear to all of the 
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This resolution made explicit what was implicit in Randolph’s proposed Vir-
ginia Plan: the work of the Convention would not be limited to revising the 
Articles, but rather would extend to the drafting of an entirely new system of 
government.  The proposal was agreed to with only Connecticut voting 
against, thus setting the stage for the drafting of a new constitution over the 
coming months.37 
In those six days, Morris also injected himself into the debate over the 
issue of representation in the national legislature, seconding James Madison’s 
motion calling for proportional representation of the states.38  This resolution 
at first seemed to place the specter of dissolution over the Convention.  
George Reed of Delaware was the first to speak after Morris seconded Mad-
ison’s resolution, reminding the Convention that the Delaware delegation 
was prohibited by their commission to agreeing to any change on the issue 
of representation in the legislature.39  Furthermore, Reed warned the Con-
vention that if such a change were to be made “it might become their duty 
to retire from the Convention.”40  Madison noted, however, that Reed’s 
warning lacked force; several delegates rose to express their skepticism that 
the Act of Delaware could “require or justify a secession of her deputies.”41  In 
what would become a trend over the course of the summer, Morris was less 
than diplomatic in his response, drawing his own line in the sand.42  Despite 
the “valuable assistance” provided by the Delaware delegation, he argued 
that the issue of proportional representation was “so fundamental an article 
in a national Govt. that it could not be dispensed with.”43  On May 30, the 
Convention voted to save this contentious measure for a later date, and two 
days later Morris retired, returning to his seat a month later on July 2.44 
Thus, Morris needed only six days at the Convention to stake out his 
position on two major issues: First, he established his support for a strong, 
national government by proposing his resolution to discard the Articles and 
draft a new form of government altogether; and second, he advocated for 
proportional representation of the states in the national legislature, even if it 
meant losing the participation of smaller states in the new government.  Mor-
 
delegates: The Articles of Confederation amounted to nothing more than a treaty among 
individual, sovereign states, and any such treaty, so long as the states retained their sover-
eignty, could never be the basis for a proper and durable union.”   
  BEEMAN, supra note 11, at 100. 
 37 Id. at 35. 
 38 Id. at 36.  Madison’s motion did not specify whether a state’s representation would be proportioned 
by population or by some other means, such as wealth.  Id. at 35–37.  
 39  Id. at 37. 
 40 Id.  
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 BROOKHISER, supra note 19, at 81. 
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ris’s position on the latter issue would evolve over the course of the Conven-
tion, but his commitment to a strong national government never wavered.  
Wilson would agree with Morris on both scores, and he would address both 
of these issues and more during Morris’s month-long absence. 
II.  JAMES WILSON AND THE VIRGINIA PLAN: MAY 31–JULY 1 
During Morris’s absence, the Convention began to address the Virginia 
Plan.  In brief, the plan provided for a bicameral legislature with representa-
tion in both chambers being proportional either to the state’s population or 
to the sum of the state’s contribution to the national treasury.  The members 
of the lower house would be elected by popular vote, and the members of the 
upper house by the members of the lower house (picking from nominees cho-
sen by the state legislatures).  The legislature would have broad authority to 
legislate in “all cases to which the separate States are incompetent,” and 
would also have the ability to veto any law passed by a state legislature.45  
The plan specified little about the executive other than its existence,46 and 
the major provision regarding the judiciary was that its members would be 
chosen by the legislature, not the executive.47 
The Convention continued where Morris left off: the structure, powers, 
and mode of appointment of the lower house.48  On Thursday, May 31—the 
day Morris left the Convention—James Wilson rose to speak for the first 
time.49  In that first speech, Wilson did more than just opine on the issue at 
hand; he also began articulating his broader views on the purpose of republi-
can government.  No government, but especially no republican government, 
he argued, could last without the confidence of the people; and there was no 
better way to engender the confidence of the people than by “drawing the 
most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people.”50  
Wilson likened the federal government to a “pyramid,” with the lower house 
of Congress representing the foundation.51  Given that he was for “raising the 
federal pyramid to a considerable altitude,” it must rest upon “as broad a basis 
as possible,” meaning that participation in elections should be extended to as 
 
 45  1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 12, at 21. 
 46  See Ewald, supra note 9, at 946 (“Indeed, Articles 7 and 8 of the Virginia Plan said little more than 
that an Executive should exist, and that it should have the power of a veto.  Unspecified were: the 
term of office; the manner of election; who should make the election; whether and on what grounds 
the Executive could be removed from office, and, if so, by whom; whether the Executive should be 
eligible for re-election; and even whether there should be one Executive or many.”).  
 47 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 12, at 21. 
 48 BEEMAN, supra note 11, at 105. 
 49  1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 12, at 49.   
 50  Id. 
 51  Id. 
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many as possible.52  Wilson concluded his first speech by laying the ground-
work for the debate over the Senate, arguing that all legislators—implicitly 
including those in the upper house—should be elected by the people and that 
it would be wrong to “increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making 
them the electors of the national Legislature.”53  In just his first speech, Wilson 
began to articulate his theory of popular sovereignty.54 
With the support of James Madison, and overcoming opposition from a 
coalition led by Elbridge Gerry and Roger Sherman,55 the Convention voted 
6-2-2 in favor of “election of the first branch of the national Legislature, by 
the people.”56  The Convention immediately moved to Article 5 of the Vir-
ginia Plan, which provided for election of the second branch of the Legisla-
ture by the first branch selecting from candidates nominated by the state leg-
islatures.  Wilson rose from his chair on that same day to argue against 
Randolph’s plan for the Senate.  He expressed his support for proportional 
representation—even in the Senate—arguing that equal senatorial districts 
could be created that cut across state lines,57 thus keeping his views on the 
Senate in accordance with his theory of one-person-one-vote.  Although the 
Convention rejected the Virginia Plan’s proposal for the Senate, it also de-
clined to adopt Wilson’s.  The Convention then turned to the issue of legis-
lative power, where Wilson remained silent as the delegates debated and 
adopted a general principle of enumerated powers for the Legislature.58 
A.  The Executive 
From June 1 through June 4, the Convention turned to the Executive, for 
which the Virginia Plan provided very little to frame the debate.59  One of the 
most important issues to be decided regarding the Executive was the number 
of magistrates it would contain: one or many.  The colonists’ experience with 
King George III led several states to experiment with executive councils in 
lieu of a single governor,60 and similar schemes were proposed for the national 
 
 52  Id. 
 53 Id.   
 54 Ewald, supra note 9, at 942 (highlighting James Wilson’s first substantive statement during the Con-
stitutional Convention and detailing Wilson’s theory of a “pyramid of government” resting on “the 
broad basis of popular sovereignty.”). 
 55 BEEMAN, supra note 11, at 111, 114. 
 56 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 12, at 50. 
 57 Id. at 51–52. 
 58 Ewald, supra note 9, at 945. 
 59 See id. at 946 (“Unspecified were: the term of office; the manner of election; who should make the 
election; whether and on what grounds the Executive could be removed from office, and, if so, by 
whom; whether the Executive should be eligible for re-election; and even whether there should be 
one Executive or many.”). 
 60 WOOD, supra note 3, at 137 (“In Pennsylvania, where radical Whig thought found its fullest expres-
sion, the governor was actually totally eliminated, and replaced by an Executive Council of twelve, 
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government at the Convention.  James Wilson, despite the revolutionary fear 
harbored by many delegates of a monarchial executive, was a forceful advo-
cate for a single magistrate.61  Wilson argued that “[u]nity in the Executive 
instead of being the fetus of Monarchy would be the best safeguard against 
tyranny.”62  Nevertheless, his motion for a single executive was postponed.63  
Regarding the mode of appointing the Executive, Wilson trod carefully.  First, 
he expressed his hesitation even to offer his views, worrying that “it might 
appear chimerical.”64  He then proceeded to declare his support, “at least . . . 
in theory,” for popular election of the Executive, citing the experiences of New 
York and Massachusetts as evidence of this method’s “convenien[ce] and suc-
cess[ ].”65  As with both branches of the Legislature, he believed the Executive 
should be chosen in a manner that is consistent with the principle of popular 
sovereignty.  If the people truly hold the ultimate political authority, then they 
should be entrusted with appointing the Executive.66 
The idea of the national Legislature electing the Executive had gained 
considerable support, but Wilson believed that such a measure would place 
too much power in the Legislature.67  Sensing that his proposal for popular 
election of the Executive was dead in the water, he pivoted to a compromise 
position, proposing a method strikingly similar to the Electoral College.  Un-
der Wilson’s plan, the people would directly elect special electors who would 
then convene to choose the Executive.68  This proposal, Wilson believed, 
maintained the involvement of the people, albeit indirectly, while mollifying 
elements of the Convention who harbored fears about the direct involvement 
of the people in choosing the Executive.  The measure was voted down, but 
would be returned to later.69 
Wilson continued to address issues regarding the Executive over the pro-
ceeding days, arguing forcefully against John Dickinson’s proposal that the 
Executive be removable on the request of a majority of the state legislatures.  
Once again, Wilson invoked the principle of one-person-one-vote; Dickin-
 
who were elected directly by the people . . . .”). 
 61 See generally BAILYN, supra note 7, at 55–93 (discussing pre-Revolutionary conceptions of power and 
American colonists’ understanding of the threat that power in the hands of a corrupt despot posed 
to liberty). 
 62  1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 12, at 66. 
 63 Id. 
 64  Id. at 68. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 69.  At this time, Wilson also argued for a short term of office—three years—and no term 
limits.  The Convention initially agreed to a seven-year term for the executive but would return to 
the issue at a later date.  Id. at 68–69. 
 67  Id. at 80. 
 68  Id. 
 69 Id. at 80–81; Ewald, supra note 9, at 949. 
180 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:1 
son’s proposal would give outsized influence to small states, allowing a mi-
nority of the people to either prevent the removal of a criminal or allow for 
the removal of the Executive for partisan reasons.70  He also argued once 
again—this time winning the support of the Convention—for a measure 
providing for a single executive.71  Finally, Wilson argued for investing the 
Executive, ideally independently but perhaps jointly with the Judiciary, with 
an absolute veto over legislation.72  This measure was postponed, and the 
Convention provisionally agreed to vest the Executive with a veto that could 
be overridden by a two-thirds vote in each branch of the Legislature.73 
Over these four days Wilson, more than any other delegate, sketched a 
vision of the presidency that closely resembles the one we have today: a single 
Executive whose authority was derived from the people, thus imbuing the 
office with a national character that would allow its occupant to transcend 
the sectional quarrels of the Legislature and govern for all of the people.  Ra-
ther than representing a threat to the people, James Wilson’s executive would 
be the guarantor of their rights. 
B.  The Judiciary 
On Tuesday, June 5 the Convention turned to Clause 9 of the Virginia 
Plan, which provided for a national judiciary appointed by the Legislature.74  
Wilson opposed the measure and was the first to speak when it was brought up 
for debate.  “Intrigue, partiality, and concealment,” he argued, “were the nec-
essary consequences” of such appointments by a numerous body.75  This en-
gendered a response from John Rutledge that vesting the Executive with such 
power would inch it too close to monarchy—a sentiment that was no doubt 
shared by those other delegates who favored a federal plan.76  Nevertheless, Mad-
ison moved, and the Convention passed, a resolution striking out “appointment 
by the Legislature” from the Virginia Plan to be left blank and filled at a later 
date.77  On the last measure of the day, the Convention vested the Legislature 
with the power to establish lower national courts, thus declining to provide for 
their creation in the Constitution.78  The Convention then adjourned and pre-
pared to return to the battle over the Legislature the next morning.79   
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C.  The House 
The issue of electing the lower branch of the Legislature was back on the 
agenda on June 6.80  Wilson rose to defend the popular election of the lower 
house, which was under attack by the South Carolina delegation’s proposal 
to have that house elected by the state legislatures.81  Once again, it is clear 
that Wilson’s views were not formulated in isolation to other issues, but rather 
they represented a piece of a remarkably well-thought-out and thorough view 
of government: 
He wished for vigor in the Govt. but he wished that vigorous authority to 
flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority.  The Govt. 
ought to possess not only 1st. the force but 2ndly. the mind or sense of the people 
at large.  The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole 
Society.  Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for 
the people to act collectively.82 
In this speech, he continued to advocate for a form of government grounded 
in the principle of popular sovereignty.  If ultimate political authority does 
reside in the people, it follows, then, that the people should have responsibil-
ity for choosing their agents in government.  In the same speech, Wilson also 
made an argument that James Madison would later make in Federalist No. 
1083: “There is no danger of improper elections if made by large districts. Bad 
elections proceed from the smallness of the districts which give an oppor-
tunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.”84  Many of Wilson’s 
contemporaries subscribed to the conventional wisdom that republican gov-
ernment could only thrive in small territories.  Wilson, however, turned this 
perceived liability—America’s extensive territory—into a virtue. 
Wilson also answered the charge that the national government might en-
gulf the state governments.  He perceived “no incompatability [sic] between 
the national & State Govts. provided the latter were restrained to certain 
local purposes; nor any probability of their being devoured by the former.”85  
To Wilson’s mind, the reverse was more likely: “In all confederated systems 
antient [sic] & modern the reverse had happened; the Generality being de-
stroyed gradually by the usurpations of the parts composing it.”86  Wilson’s 
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arguments, along with those of Madison, Mason, Dickinson and Pierce, car-
ried the day and the measure providing for electing of the first branch of the 
Legislature by the state legislatures was voted down.87 
D.  The Senate 
On June 7, the Convention turned once again to the second branch of 
the Legislature, opening debate on John Dickinson’s measure to allow the 
state legislatures to elect the Senate.88  James Wilson continued to argue in 
favor of the theory of proportional representation over the proceeding days.  
Once again, he stressed the importance of popular sovereignty: 
If we are to establish a national Government, that Government ought to flow 
from the people at large.  If one branch of it should be chosen by the Legis-
latures, and the other by the people, the two branches will rest on different 
foundations, and dissentions will naturally arise between them.89 
For Wilson, popular sovereignty was not just rhetoric; rather, this principle 
carried real, legal significance.  Adhering to this principle—maintaining the 
participation of the people in government—would provide a stable founda-
tion on which a republican government could be built.  This marked a sharp 
departure from the classical political theorists, such as Gouverneur Morris, 
who believed that this separation of interests would provide for balance ra-
ther than instability. 
In response to his argument for proportional representation, Wilson was 
accused of trying to abolish the states.90  “The British Governm[ent],” he 
replied, “cannot be our model.”91  This was evident because of the stark dif-
ference in character and laws of the British and American people.  The only 
danger Wilson saw was that of the states “devouring the national Gov[ern-
ment].”92  Both governments were compatible with each other, as both op-
erated in separate “orbits.”93  Despite this lengthy argument, Wilson’s plan 
for popular election of the Senate was soundly rejected.94 
During the subsequent debate over Madison’s proposal to vest the Senate 
with an absolute veto over state laws, Wilson elaborated on his fear of “the 
whole,” or “the general interest,” being consumed by the interests of “each 
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part,” or the “local interests.”95  The Articles failed, he argued, because the 
“jealousy & ambition” of the states predominated over the national interest.96  
Regarding the states, “[e]ach endeavoured to cut a slice from the common 
loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length the confederation became frittered 
down to the impotent condition in which it now stands.”97  This proposal, 
however, is somewhat puzzling in the context of Wilson’s broader theory of 
government, and there is reason to believe that his support for it was based 
more on tactics than principle.98  It was voted down with only three large 
states—Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Massachusetts—voting in favor.99 
The Convention then turned back to the question of proportional repre-
sentation in the Senate—a debate that would hold the attention of the dele-
gates for much of the next five weeks.  At this time, the coalition of small 
states began to present a strong front in favor of the one-state-one-vote theory 
in the Senate.  Wilson’s support of one-person-one-vote, however, remained 
unshaken.  Noting that Pennsylvania had more than double the population 
of New Jersey, Wilson asked, “Shall New-Jersey have the same right or influ-
ence in the councils of the nation with Pennsylvania?”100  He quickly an-
swered his own question: 
I say no.  It is unjust – I never will confederate on this plan . . . I say again I 
never will confederate on his principles.  If no state will part with any of its 
sovereignty, it is in vain to talk of a national government.  The state who has 
five times the number of inhabitants ought, nay must have the same propor-
tion of weight in the representation.  If there was a probability of equalizing 
the states, he would be for it.  But we have no such power.  If however, we 
depart from the principle of representation in proportion to the numbers, we 
will lose the object of our meeting.101 
No other delegate argued as consistently and thoroughly for the principle of 
one-person-one-vote as did Wilson.  In doing so, he revealed a deep under-
standing of the principles on which American democracy is based as well as 
a prescient view of where it would go over the next two hundred years. 
By this point in the Convention, James Wilson had sketched out his gen-
eral theory of government—a theory that was remarkably thorough and con-
sistent.  Wilson was firmly in the nationalist camp, but he can be distinguished 
from other nationalists by his views on popular sovereignty and his consistent 
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adherence to the principle of one-person-one-vote; he believed that if this re-
public, founded on the authority of the people, was to prosper then the people 
must be truly represented, and represented equally, in all branches.  When 
Gouverneur Morris returned in July, the nationalists would gain another ad-
vocate.  But as we will see, Morris’s ideology was often at odds with Wilson’s, 
even when they were in agreement on a particular measure. 
E.  June 11–July 2 
In the weeks leading up to Morris’s return on July 2, the delegates 
climbed deeper into the contentious debate of proportional representation in 
the Senate.  On June 15, William Patterson introduced the “New Jersey 
Plan” or the “Small-state Plan” which featured a unicameral legislature that 
would be proportioned according to the one-state-one-vote principle.102  The 
plan was not taken seriously in its entirety, and the Convention remained 
committed to a bicameral legislature, but its introduction pushed the issue of 
proportional representation in the Senate to the top of the agenda.103 
III.  GOUVERNEUR MORRIS RETURNS: JULY 2–JULY 26 
Gouverneur Morris returned on Monday, July 2, one day before the Con-
vention adjourned to observe the eleventh anniversary of America’s independ-
ence from Great Britain.  On his return, the delegates were, as Roger Sherman 
explained, “at a full stop.”104  The issue of proportional representation had 
consumed the Convention for weeks and tensions were at an all-time high.105  
Gouverneur Morris wasted no time rising to speak in what started out as an 
expression of support for the formation of a “compromise committee” but 
quickly transitioned into a lengthy discussion of his views on government.106   
Silenced for over a month, Morris was ready to make up for lost time. 
Like James Wilson, Morris advocated for a strong national government, 
but he did so based on principles directly at odds with Wilson’s theory of pop-
ular sovereignty.  Only the first branch of the Legislature, he argued, originated 
from the people, while the second branch must be composed of “men of great 
and established property—an aristocracy.  Men, who from pride will support 
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consistency and permanency.”107  This second branch must provide a check 
on the excesses of the first.  Morris continued, “The first branch, originating 
from the people, will ever be subject to precipitancy, changeability, and excess. . . . 
This can only be checked by ability and virtue in the second branch.”108  Fur-
thermore, to “make them completely independent,” the members of the se-
cond branch “must be chosen for life, or they will be a useless body.”109  Shorter 
terms for the second branch, he argued, would defeat its purpose.110 
Acknowledging that aristocratic bodies have their own excesses, he then 
explained the benefits of confining them in their own branch of government.  
“It is good policy,” he argued, “that men of property be collected in one 
body, to give them common influence in your government.”111  By giving the 
aristocracy its own branch of government, “you secure their weight for the 
public good.”112  He continued: 
The Rich will strive to establish their dominion & enslave the rest.  They al-
ways did.  They always will.  The proper security ag[ainst] them is to form 
them into a separate interest.  The two forces will then controul each other.  
Let the rich mix with the poor and in a Commercial Country, they will estab-
lish an Oligarchy.  Take away commerce, and the democracy will triumph.  
Thus it has been all the world over.  So it will be among us. . . . By thus com-
bining & setting apart, the aristocratic interest, the popular interest will be 
combined ag[ainst] it.  There will be a mutual check and mutual security.113 
Without their own body, he argued, the aristocracy would still influence 
events, but they would do so in “some left-handed way.”114  Providing for an 
aristocratic body, therefore, arose out of his fear of the aristocracy’s malevo-
lent influence and his hope that confining their interests within a single 
branch of government would check their abuses.115 
Regarding their mode of appointment, Morris was firmly against demo-
cratic elections, suggesting instead that it be left to the Executive to make 
appointments and fill vacancies.  Allowing democratic concerns to permeate 
the Senate would defeat its purpose: 
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The aristocratic body, should be as independent & as firm as the democratic.  
If the members of it are to revert to a dependence on the democratic choice.  
The democratic scale will preponderate.  All the guards contrived by Amer-
ica have not restrained the Senatorial branches of the Legislatures from a 
servile complaisance to the democratic.  If the 2d. branch is to be dependent 
we are better without it.116 
Thus, in his first speech back at the Convention, Morris firmly established 
himself as a proponent of a strong national government—“A firm Governt. 
alone can protect our liberties,” he argued117—but one founded on very dif-
ferent principles than those articulated by James Wilson.  Morris saw class 
distinctions as inherent in society.  He argued that while the people and the 
aristocracy each offer something unique to society, both also have their vices; 
to provide a proper check on these vices, these two classes must have their 
own power centers in government so that they may be “turned agst. each 
other” for their mutual benefit;118 if such a balance is to function properly, 
the aristocratic body must be composed of men of property and virtue, ap-
pointed for life and independent from the democratic branch.119  Finally, 
despite the arguments he made in his first six days at the Convention, he now 
argued that a body so composed rendered moot the question of proportional 
representation; however the Senate is apportioned, its members will gener-
ally have the same interests.  “You may begin with any ratio you please,” he 
argued, “it will come to the same thing.”120   
A.  A Representative of America 
When the Convention returned following the Independence Day holi-
day, the compromise committee presented its proposal: the lower house of 
the Legislature would be represented proportional to a state’s population, 
while in the upper house the states would be represented equally.121  Wilson 
objected, arguing that the issue of the first branch had been settled and that 
the committee had exceeded their authority in re-addressing it.122  Morris 
objected too, but at greater length.  In his address he emphasized the national 
character of the government and the dangers of allowing sectional interests 
to predominate: 
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Oct. 2017]      MORRIS AND WILSON AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 187 
He came here as a Representative of America; he flattered himself he came 
here in some degree as a Representative of the whole human race; for the 
whole human race will be affected by the proceedings of this Convention.  
He wished gentlemen to extend their views beyond the present moment of 
time; beyond the narrow limits of place from which they derive their political 
origin.  If he were to believe some things which he had heard, he should 
suppose that we were assembled to truck and bargain for our particular 
States.123 
Morris saw two major threats if politics were to devolve into sectional dis-
putes, rather than a joint pursuit of national interests.  First, he foresaw sec-
tional interests leading to armed conflict between the states: “This Country 
must be united.  If persuasion does not unite it, the sword will.”124  Second, 
he believed that foreign powers would use the confusion created by such sec-
tional crises as an opportunity to pursue their interests on the continent.  
Morris’s plan for the Senate, he believed, would obviate this tendency to pur-
sue sectional interests, while the plan developed in the committee would lead 
to “constant disputes & appeals to the States which will undermine the 
Gen[eral] Government . . . .”125 
Morris believed that a wholly national government provided the best 
chance at creating an enduring republic.  Although he did not call for the 
abolition of state and local governments, like Wilson, he frequently expressed 
the danger they present to a well-functioning general government.  He cited 
the experience of Germany, which at the time was not unified and would not 
be for another eighty-four years, as a cautionary tale to the delegates: 
We must have an efficient Govt. and if there be an efficiency in the local 
Govts. the former is impossible.  Germany alone proves it.  Notwithstanding 
their common diet, notwithstanding the great prerogatives of the Emperor 
as head of the Empire, and his vast resources as sovereign of his particular 
dominions, no union is maintained: foreign influence disturbs every internal 
operation, & there is no energy whatever in the general Governmt.  Whence 
does this proceed?  From the energy of the local authorities; from its being 
considered more consequence to support the Prince of Hesse, than the Hap-
piness of the people of Germany.  Do gentlemen wish this to be ye case 
here.126 
The similarities between America and Germany, he argued, are striking: 
both peoples were bound by a common language and culture as well as a 
common interest in unification; but in Germany, sectional interests had taken 
precedence over national concerns, thus preventing unification.  Morris then 
asked rhetorically: “What if all the Charters & Constitutions of the States 
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were thrown into the fire, and all their demagogues into the ocean[?]  What 
would it be to the happiness of America[?]”127 
The solution, Morris reiterated, was his plan for a Senate that could be 
counted on to consider the interests of the nation.  A Senate whose members 
were drawn from the people and served short terms would function similarly 
to the lower house, being prone to devolve into sectional disputes.  Morris 
argued forcefully for his plan, stating that other plans claimed to protect the 
rights of individuals or states, but only his “support[ed] the dignity and splendor 
of the American Empire.”128  In the end, Morris reluctantly came to support 
proportional representation in the Senate; he did so, however, only because 
his plan for the Senate lacked support, not because his thoughts on govern-
ment had in any way changed.  He still contended that the apportionment 
of the second branch was irrelevant under his plan, but sensing that his plan 
lacked the necessary support he argued that “[a]s [the Senate] is now consti-
tuted he must be agst. its being drawn from the States in equal portions.”129 
B.  All Other Persons 
Before a solution regarding apportionment of the Legislature could be 
reached, the Convention would first confront the issue of slavery.  While some 
delegates—Morris included—spoke out against the institution, they never 
constituted a large enough coalition to threaten putting an end to the practice.  
To the extent slavery was discussed at the Convention it was mostly in the 
context of how slaves factored into a state’s representation in the Legislature.  
James Wilson was one of the original cosponsors of the three-fifths ratio but 
by July 11 he was having second thoughts.  Madison wrote in his notes: 
Mr. Wilson did not well see on what principle the admission of blacks in the 
proportion of three fifths could be explained.  Are they admitted as Citizens?  
Then why are they not admitted on an equality with White Citizens?  Are 
they admitted as property?  [T]hen why is not other property admitted into 
the computation?130 
This speech highlights the tensions between Wilson the tactician, who had 
seen the three-fifths measure as a means of keeping the southern states at the 
Convention, and Wilson the political theorist, who could not square his own 
proposal with his ideology.  There was also support among several of the 
delegates for apportioning the Legislature on the basis of property, or some 
combination of population and property, which naturally led to some very 
contradictory arguments regarding how slaves should be factored.  Initially, 
Wilson argued for the three-fifths ratio because it was agreed that slaves were 
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to be classified as “persons.”131  At the time of this speech, however, there 
was a dispute over whether they would be considered persons or property 
and Wilson could no longer justify such a clause.  It is clear from Wilson’s 
arguments, however, that he knew the issue to be so contentious that it could 
threaten a break-up of the Convention.  Despite the questions raised in the 
aforementioned paragraph, he stated: “These were difficulties however 
which . . . must be overruled by the necessity of compromise.”132 
Gouverneur Morris, on the other hand, did not mince words regarding 
his position.  Morris found himself “reduced to the dilemma of doing injustice 
to the Southern States or to human nature, and he must therefore do it to 
the former.”133  Agreeing to the three-fifths ratio, he believed, would effec-
tively lend his encouragement to the slave trade.  Morris knew that the south-
ern states would never agree to a Constitution that ended the slave trade, but 
at that time he was still unwilling to compromise. 
The next day, July 12, Morris moved that the formula for apportioning 
representation in the Legislature should be the same as for apportioning tax-
ation.134  He contended that if southern states counted slaves towards their 
representation, they must also count towards their taxes owed to the national 
government.  A number of delegates, including James Wilson, and Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney and Pierce Butler of South Carolina, spoke in favor of 
the measure.135  The tenor of the debate took a sharp turn, however, when 
William Davie of North Carolina took to the floor, declaring, “[ I ]t was high 
time now to speak out.”136  “It was meant by some gentlemen,” he argued, 
“to deprive the Southern States of any share of Representation for their 
blacks.”137  If those gentlemen were to be successful, he promised that “the 
business [of the Convention] was at an end.”138  Morris had poked the south-
ern delegates in the eye and they had responded in kind. 
In response, Morris once again eschewed the language of compromise.  
“It has been said that it is high time to speak out,” he stated, and “as one 
member, he would candidly do so.”139  He then proceeded to make a varia-
tion on the argument he had been making for the past two weeks: that he 
endeavored to form a government for the national good, and that sectional is-
sues such as these will only tear apart the nation.  He continued: 
He came here to form a compact for the good of America.  He was ready to 
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do so with all the States: He hoped & believed that all would enter into such 
a Compact.  If they would not he was ready to join with any States that 
would.  But as the Compact was to be voluntary, it is in vain for the Eastern 
States to insist on what the Southern States will never agree to.140 
By threatening to confederate without the southern states, Morris had drawn 
a red line that most other northern delegates were not prepared to draw, and 
thus would be impossible to enforce.  Instead of spurring the southern dele-
gates to compromise, Morris’s speech produced a renewed push for a full ac-
counting of slaves in a state’s representation.141  Wilson, blessed with greater 
abilities as a tactician, sought to control the blaze by including slaves in a 
state’s representation indirectly: slaves would factor into taxation, and repre-
sentation would be based off of taxation.142  In the end, the Convention re-
turned to the same three-fifths ratio that had been established when the de-
bate started.  Morris would return to the issue on August 8 to deliver a lengthy 
address about the “nefarious institution” of domestic slavery, but at that late 
stage there was little appetite among the delegates for such a contentious 
fight.143  Morris’s speeches—rousing as they were—did not affect the final 
outcome and had threatened a break-up of the Convention in the process. 
C.  The Interior Country 
The debate over representation also encompassed the issue of representa-
tion for new states that would inevitably be admitted as the nation expanded 
westward.  While Morris “looked forward to that range of New States which 
w[ould] soon be formed in the west,” he believed that those new states should 
never out-represent the Atlantic states in the Legislature.144  This is a curious 
position to take, especially for someone who frequently warned the Conven-
tion against sectionalism and who urged his fellow delegates to act in the best 
interests of the nation as a whole.  He framed his position, however, as being 
for the good of the country: “The new States will know less of the public in-
terest than [the Atlantic states], will have an interest in many respects differ-
ent, in particular will be little scrupulous of involving the Community in wars 
the burdens & operations of which would fall chiefly on the maritime 
States.”145  This would not be unjust, he argued, because the new states would 
be fully informed of the conditions on which they would enter the union.146 
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At first glance, this issue appears to be Morris’s most glaring contradic-
tion at the Convention.  Throughout the summer he had stressed the im-
portance of a national government that could withstand sectional bickering.  
One might be hard pressed to describe this plan any other way than as a 
means of promoting the sectional interests of the Atlantic states.  Morris did 
not conceive of his argument in this way, however.  As a classical political 
theorist, one who believed that republican governments were dependent 
upon men of virtue rising to positions of leadership, he worried that it would 
be to the detriment of the nation as a whole if “uncultivated” men from the 
western territories were given too much political power.  This is why his ar-
guments often took on a high-minded tone, such as when he questioned 
whether the western states could “furnish men equally enlightened, to share 
in the administration of our common interests.”147  He also argued that the 
western citizens’ lack of interest in commerce and separation from any war 
that might occur in the Atlantic states would cause their interests to run con-
trary to those of the national interest.148  In this way, then, his position is 
actually quite consistent with his overall political philosophy; he believed that 
virtuous men were required to advance the national interest, and he was not 
confident in the ability for such virtue to be fostered on the frontier.   
Madison and Wilson quickly trained their fire on Morris’s plan.  In a 
lengthy address on July 11, Madison was “clear & firm in opinion that no 
unfavorable distinctions were admissible either in point of justice or pol-
icy.”149  Wilson then addressed the Convention on July 13, in a speech that 
put the issue to rest for the remainder of the Convention.  He compared 
Morris’s plan to the British treatment of the colonies before the Revolution: 
The majority of people wherever found ought in all questions to govern the 
minority.  If the interior Country should acquire this majority they will not 
only have the right, but will avail themselves of it whether we will or no.  This 
jealousy misled the policy of G. Britain with regard to America.  The fatal 
maxims espoused by her were that the Colonies were growing too fast, and 
that their growth must be stinted in time.  What were the consequences?  
[F]irst[,] enmity on our part, then actual separation.  Like consequences will 
result on the part of the interior settlements, if like jealousy & policy be pur-
sued on ours.150 
Nonetheless, Morris’s arguments were not entirely unpersuasive.  The next 
day four state delegations voted to include a measure that would limit the 
number of representatives from all future western states to the number of 
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representatives in the original Atlantic states.151   The measure was voted 
down, however, with five states voting against and one state divided.152 
On July 16, the Convention ended the debate over representation by nar-
rowly adopting the infamous “Connecticut Compromise.”153  This name is 
somewhat misleading, as proportional representation of the lower house had 
already been agreed to and was not seriously in jeopardy.  Therefore, the 
agreement was much less of a compromise as it was a win for the small states 
and a loss for those, like Wilson and, reluctantly, Morris, who advocated for 
proportional representation.  Whatever the name, this agreement provided for 
apportionment of the Senate on the principle of equal representation among 
the states.  For the next ten days until the Convention adjourned on July 26 to 
allow the Committee of Detail to prepare a working document, the delegates 
debated more detailed matters, including those related to the Executive and 
the Judiciary.  Gouverneur Morris used the discussion of these matters as an 
invitation to address a wide range of issues regarding the purpose and function 
of the Executive—thoughts that, he might have believed, his fellow delegates 
had been unjustly deprived of during his absence from the Convention. 
D.  Morris’s Executive 
On July 19, Luther Martin of Maryland moved that the President should 
not be eligible for a second term.  Gouverneur Morris immediately rose to 
respond.  Over the course of his lengthy address, he would eventually discuss 
the question of re-eligibility, but “it is necessary,” he told the Convention, to 
first “take into one view all that relates to the establishment of the Execu-
tive.”154  He would get to Mr. Martin’s motion, but only after he shared eve-
rything that was on his mind regarding the Executive. 
He began with the proposition, one that was considered conventional 
wisdom at the time, that republican governments could not endure in exten-
sive territories.  Governments in which “the people” play an important role 
could prosper in small territories such as the ancient Greek city-states, but 
they would face serious problems in a country as extensive as America.  This 
problem presented the delegates with two options, Morris argued: “We must 
either then renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with 
sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it.”155  Given those options, Morris 
argued forcefully for a strong Executive. 
Like Wilson, Morris conceived of the Executive as being the “guardian 
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of the people, even of the lower classes.”156  The threat of legislative tyranny 
was not obviated by the creation of a Senate; its role was to provide a check 
on hastily drafted or ill-advised legislation passed by the lower house.  It 
therefore fell to the Executive to be the “great protector of the Mass of the 
people.”157  To effectively carry out this role, the Executive must be vested 
with the power to appoint officers and judges, to command the military, and 
to veto ill-advised legislation.158   
Furthermore, the Executive must be re-eligible.  Morris’s theory of re-
eligibility is grounded in his views on human nature.  Man possesses an in-
herent desire to seek glory, he argued.  Seeing as human nature cannot be 
changed, it is the job of constitution-makers to devise a system that enlists 
man’s vices, such as the lust for recognition, on the side of the public good.  
Re-eligibility creates, in his words, a “[c]ivil road to Glory.”159  Without it, 
the consequences are clear: “[ I ]t will destroy the great incitement to merit 
public esteem by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a reappoint-
ment.  It may give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the 
human breast.”160  Without the “civil road,” men would be left to seek glory 
“by the sword.”161 
Morris argued against allowing for the impeachment of the Executive, 
but he would change his position the very next day.162  This change would 
arise, however, without a change in the principle on which his opinion is 
based.  In his July 19 speech, he argued against impeachment because he was 
also arguing for short, two-year terms.  Under such an arrangement, any 
executive who acted with impropriety would surely have their reappointment 
withheld by the people.  Allowing for impeachment by the Legislature in this 
circumstance would only open the Executive to being controlled by “dema-
gogue[s] in the Legislature.”163  In his speech on July 20, however, it became 
clear that such short terms lacked support among the delegates; therefore, he 
stated that “[h]e was now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if the 
Executive was to continue for any time in office.”164  Impeachments should 
result only in the Executive’s punishment as an officer, not as a man; this 
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meant that a president could lose his position but not be open to criminal 
sanctions from the Legislature.165 
To effectively serve as the “guardian of the people,” Morris argued that 
the Executive must be independent from the Legislature.  Furthermore, he 
saw only two measures that could provide such independence: appointment 
for life or appointment by popular election.  Morris did not consider lifetime 
appointments for the Executive to be a realistic idea, and thus he argued 
forcefully for popular elections.  Morris had discussed his thoughts on this 
matter in a speech on July 17: 
He will be the mere creature of the Legisl[ature]: if appointed & impeacha-
ble by that body . . . If the people should elect, they will never fail to prefer 
some man of distinguished character, or services; some man, if he might so 
speak, of continental reputation.  If the Legislature elect, it will be the work 
of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction: it will be like the election of a pope by a 
conclave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment.166 
Echoing Wilson’s argument from earlier in the summer, he also con-
tended that the vastness of the electorate for the Executive would work in its 
favor.  “The extent of the Country,” he argued, “would secure his re-election 
ag[ainst] the factions & discontents of particular States.”167  The national 
electorate would be too large for the sort of intrigue that plagued the legisla-
tures to affect the outcome.  An added bonus of this plan was that it would 
be “extremely palatable to the people.”168  Morris no doubt understood that 
whatever plan of government emerged from the Convention would require 
the support of the people to be enacted and to endure over the coming years. 
In the debates over the Executive, Morris and Wilson’s preferences were 
almost always aligned: both argued for a single magistrate, elected by the 
people and independent from the other branches of government; there was 
much more daylight, however, between their rationale for these preferences.  
Morris harbored serious concerns about the potential for legislative tyranny 
and he believed that this configuration of the Executive would provide the 
best check on those tendencies.169  Wilson’s rationale had less to do with bal-
ancing of power and more to do with political philosophy; most of his ideas 
regarding the Executive can be explained by his views on popular sover-
eignty.  If that principle were to mean anything, he argued, then the appoint-
ment of the Executive must be made by the people via a popular election.  
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To Wilson’s mind, a popular election was the most just means of appointing 
an executive.  Morris, arguing for the same method of appointment, did so 
because he believed it would produce the best individual who could then 
provide the best check on the Legislature. 
E.  The Judiciary 
The debate over the Judiciary lacked the contentious issues that animated 
the debates over the Legislature and had accordingly taken a back seat 
throughout the Convention.  On June 4, the delegates agreed that a national 
judiciary would exist and would “consist of one supreme tribunal and one or 
more inferior tribunals.”170  The delegates did not discuss much else besides 
this general proposition, however; still unanswered was the manner in which 
the members of the Judiciary would be appointed.  The Convention turned 
to this issue on July 18; once again, Wilson and Morris’s interests were aligned. 
Nathaniel Gorham opened the debate by arguing for appointment by the 
Executive with the advice and consent of the Senate: the position to which 
the Convention would ultimately agree.171  Wilson was the first to respond to 
Gorham, stating that while his colleague’s proposal was perhaps the second 
best option, he thought it was “his duty” to propose the best: “[ T ]hat the 
Judges be appointed by the Executive [alone].”172  Morris seconded the mo-
tion, opening up debate.173  The Convention would oscillate on this issue 
several times, first agreeing to vest the appointment of judges in the Senate 
before eventually ending up with Mr. Gorham’s proposal.  Before the issue 
was resolved, Morris conveyed his thoughts to the Convention on July 21.  
The Senate, he argued, would be ill-fitted to judge the character of judges as 
they would inevitably rely too heavily upon the “flattering pictures drawn 
from their friends.”174  The Executive, however, has the proper distance from 
the States and is well positioned to have the necessary information to make 
these appointments.  “If the Executive can be safely trusted with the com-
mand of the army,” he argued, “there can not surely be any reasonable 
ground of Jealousy in the present case.”175  Here, Morris’s reasoning mirrors 
Wilson’s concerns, expressed earlier in the Convention, that the appointment 
of judges was a task ill-suited to a body as numerous as the Senate. 
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IV.  THE FINAL STRETCH: AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 
On July 23, Elbridge Gerry proposed that the Convention appoint a 
Committee of Detail to incorporate the many measures that had been agreed 
to in a single document.  This committee was arguably the most influential of 
any convened over the course of the summer.176  Its five members, one of 
whom being James Wilson, often exceeded their jurisdiction and inserted pro-
visions into their report that had not been voted on by the full Convention.177  
For the purposes of this paper, however, the Committee of Detail effectively 
represents an end point.  The committee’s report framed the debate for the 
rest of the summer, and thus the majority of speeches took on a different char-
acter from what had been seen up to that point.  The delegates had elucidated 
their philosophic views on the nature and purpose of republican government 
in June and July, but for the remaining month and a half they would be oc-
cupied by a more detailed, clause-by-clause analysis of the committee’s report. 
During this time, Gouverneur Morris continued to opine on a large num-
ber of issues: he argued for a fourteen-year citizenship requirement for sena-
tors, which Wilson opposed;178 he argued against the inclusion of an age re-
quirement for Congressmen;179 he argued that a provision allowing for the 
president to communicate with state governors was “unnecessary and imply-
ing that he could not correspond with others”;180 he argued against the par-
don for treason;181 and he argued against restrictions that would give the 
lower house the exclusive right to originate money bills.182  Despite their con-
tinued engagement in the debate, neither Morris nor Wilson substantially 
added to or altered their theory of government in this period.183 
CONCLUSION 
If one were to listen to Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson opine on the 
nature of government independent from any specific questions about struc-
ture, one could reasonably assume that they were bitter enemies in the debates 
at the Constitutional Convention.  Over the course of the summer, Morris ar-
ticulated a more comprehensive and consistent theory of governance than he 
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is given credit for.184  His ideology fit squarely into the classical mold of political 
science; society, he argued, was inherently divided between the few and the 
many, and he believed the fruits of enlightenment thinking to be the creation 
of a mixed constitution: a form of government that could properly divide and 
balance these different interests.  Like Wilson, he advocated for a government 
of a strong, national character, but their views differed in key respects.  James 
Wilson also wanted balance, but a balance of the functions of government ra-
ther than the orders of society.  To his mind, republican government could 
only endure if the people shared in all aspects of government; if the branches 
of the Legislature were drawn from different sources, class warfare and insta-
bility—not balance and order—would result.  Morris’s desire to balance orders 
of society and Wilson’s desire to balance functions of government, mixed with 
their shared pursuit of a national government, led them to advocate for essen-
tially the same form of government at the Philadelphia Convention.  Their 
agreements at the Convention, however, were founded on diametrically op-
posed principles.  As a result, despite both being on the “winning” side of the 
constitutional debate, their legacies are as divergent as their ideologies: Mor-
ris’s classical political thought could not find its place in the democratic process 
that sprung from the Constitution, and by the close of the founding generation 
it had all but disappeared from American politics; Wilson’s theory of popular 
sovereignty, however, quickly gathered support among Americans of all polit-
ical persuasions, forming a consensus that has endured to this day.185  While 
Morris’s theories represent where American political thought had originated, 
Wilson’s represent where it would lead. 
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